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WINTER-ONLY DRILLING RESTRICTION
IS NOT SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS

OIL AND GAS-MINERAL LEASING ACT OF 1920
A winter-only drilling restriction is not a suspension of operations
and production within 30 U.S.C. §209. Copper Valley Machine
Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 474 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1994 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 1979).
Plaintiff, Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc., sought a writ of
mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior ordering him to extend by one year the term of a non-competitive oil and gas lease
pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 209.1 The action was based on a restriction
in Copper Valley's drilling permit2 that prohibited operations between April 15 and November 15. Plaintiff argued that the "winteronly" restriction was a "suspension of operations and production"
within 30 U.S.C. § 209, which entitled it to a mandatory extension
of the lease term equivalent to the period of suspension.' The government, however, maintained that Copper Valley's requested extension was actually a request for a suspension of operations and production4 and was thus properly denied by the secretary under 43
C.F.R. §3103.3-8.5
1. 474 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1994 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2,
1979). The lease was originally issued February 1, 1966, under 30 U.S.C. §226(e) (1976),
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § § 181-263 (1976).
2. The drilling permit was issued January 31, 1976, the last day of the primary term. On
the same day, Copper Valley was granted a two-year extension on the lease under 30 U.S.C.
§ 226(e) (1976) and 43 C.F.R. § 3107.2-3 (1979).
3. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
In the event the Secretary of the Interior, in the interest of conservation, shall
direct or shall assent to the suspension of operations and production under
any lease granted under the terms of this chapter, any payment of acreage
rental or of minimum royalty prescribed by such lease likewise shall be suspended during such period of suspension of operations and production; and
the term of such lease shall be extended by adding any such suspension period
thereto.
30 U.S.C. § 209 (1976). Because the drilling permit was effective during the entire two-year
extension of the lease, the restriction limited the period of actual operation to one year.
4. 30 U.S.C. §209 (1976) permits the lessee to request a suspension order as well as
allowing the Secretary to issue such an order of his own accord.
5. The regulation sets forth in part:
As to oil and gas leases, no suspension of operations and production will be
granted on any lease in the absence of a well capable of production on the
leasehold, except where the Secretary directs a suspension in the interest of
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On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held
for the secretary, finding that the winter-only restriction in Copper
Valley's drilling permit was not a "suspension of operations and
production" within 30 U.S.C. § 209.6 The court also implied that
Copper Valley's suit was barred in any event by the 90-day limitation
of the Mineral Leasing Act found in 30 U.S.C. § 226-2.1
Copper Valley argued that as the winter-only restriction was not in
the lease as originally signed, it was entitled to full enjoyment of its
lease rights during the two-year extension granted it at the end of the
original 10-year term. The provisions of the drilling permit did not

allow for two full years of use and thus effected a suspension of
operations under § 209. Citing the lack of plaintiff's authority to the
contrary, the court ruled that the conditions of the drilling permit
had been incorporated into the original leaseI
The court gave three reasons for its holding. First, the restriction
was a proper exercise of the secretary's environmental protection
authority.9 Second, Copper Valley agreed to the condition through
its failure to object when the condition was imposed in the drilling
permit' 0 and through its payment of rental without protest during
the summer season.'' Third, the court found that the plaintiff's
lease gave the secretary the authority to impose the restriction., 2
Before disposing of this issue, the district court considered one
further point. Citing legislative history,' the court held that § 209
applies primarily to extraordinary situations where the secretary
conservation. Complete information must be furnished showing the necessity
of such relief.
43 C.F.R. §3103.3-8(a) (1979). Copper Valley requested the extension on January 20,
1978. By letter of February 28, 1978, the United States Geological Survey (USGS), which is
responsible for the administration of oil and gas leases on federal land, informed Copper
Valley that because oil and gas in paying quantities had not been found prior to the
termination of the two-year extension on January 31, 1978, the lease had expired. Therefore, the USGS treated Copper Valley's January 20 letter as a request for suspension of
operations and production. 474 F. Supp. at 191 n.1.
6. Id. at 191-92.
7. Id. at 192.
8. Id. at 191. See note 2 supra.
9. 474 F. Supp. at 191 (citing California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
10. 474 F. Supp. at 190.
11. Id. at 191. Under 30 U.S.C. §209 (1976), the lessee is not required to pay rent
during a suspension of operations.
12. 474 F. Supp. at 192. Section 4 of Copper Valley's lease reads: "It is agreed that the
rate of prospecting and developing and the quality and rate of production from the lands
covered by this lease shall be subject to control in the public interest by the Secretary of the
Interior." Id. at 192 n.4.
13. The citation reads as follows in the reporter: "H.R. Rep. No. 1317, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (June 30, 1932) p. 3 and 76 Cong. Rec. and 705 (Dec. 19, 1932)." The correct
citation is: "H.R. REP. NO. 1737, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932) and 76 CONG. REC. 704,
705 (1932).
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orders a suspension to conserve oil and gas, or where the lessee
requests the action.1" Section 209 previously had been applied to
such unexpected occurrences in the Santa Barbara oil spill cases' '
relied upon by Copper Valley. However, since the present case did
not involve a surprise situation, the court found the authority inapposite. 1 6 Therefore, the winter-only drilling restriction was not a
"suspension of operations and production" under 30 U.S.C. § 209,
but was rather a condition imposed on the lease which allowed the
secretary to refuse Copper Valley's request for a suspension because
it had not established a producing well prior to the termination of its
lease.
The court then turned its attention to the 90-day limitation of
action imposed by 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 and its applicability to the
plaintiff's case. The court noted that Copper Valley had never sought
administrative review' I of the condition set forth in the drilling
permit issued January 31, 1976. Such a review culminates in a decision of the secretary 1 referred to in § 226-2.1 The running of the
statute begins with "a [final] decision of the Secretary involving an,
oil and gas lease." 2 The court found that the winter-only restriction
constituted such a decision. 2 ' Referring to the fact that the statute
had been strictly interpreted in the past, 2 2 the court implied, but did
not expressly hold, that Copper Valley's action would have been
untimely regardless of the decision on the previous issue.2
The district court's decision is important for two reasons: 1) it is
the first time § 209 has been construed outside the realm of offshore
leases, and 2) restrictions such as the one involved in this case are
commonly found in federal oil and gas leases. 2 4 Thus, the appellate
decision, which could be in Copper Valley's favor, bears watching.
The legal basis of the district court's decision is weak in places,
especially its holding that the application of 30 U.S.C. § 209 should
14. 474 F. Supp. at 192.
15. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v.
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
16. 474 F. Supp. at 192.
17. The procedure is set forth in 30 C.F.R. §290 (1977).
18. The authority of the Secretary to impose conditions on oil and gas leases is delegated
to the Area Oil and Gas Supervisor, USGS under 30 C.F.R. § 221.21 (1977); thus, the need
for the review procedure.
19. 474 F. Supp. at 192.
20. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1976).
21. 474 F. Supp. at 192.
22. See King v. Udall, 266 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1967).
23. 474 F. Supp. at 192.
24. Brief for Appellees at 16, Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus, No. 79-1994
(D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 2, 1979). The history cited by the district court was concerned
primarily with the question of charging rental during a suspension period.
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be limited primarily to surprise situations. In fact, the secretary has
abandoned his argument from legislative history on this point. 2 s On
appeal, the government now emphasizes Copper Valley's apparent
lack of diligence in pursuing drilling operations during the two-year
extension of the leasehold.2 6 However, the issue of diligence seems
to raise a question of fact, which would undermine the basis for
summary judgment, because summary judgment can decide only
legal and not factual questions.2 " A decision on this basis would first
require a trial on the question of diligence. Of course, the burden of
convincing the appellate court that a reversal is mandated is on the
appellant, therefore affirmance is always more than a bare possibility. For the present then, and possibly in the future, the District
Court of the District of Columbia will not consider winter-only drilling restrictions as suspensions of operations and production within
30 U.S.C. §209, and will not grant lessees any extension on that
basis.
PETER F. LINDBORG

25. Id. at 16-21.
26. Brief for Appellant at 31-33, Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus, No.
79-1994 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 2, 1979).
27. Id. at 9-15. The leases in the Santa Barbara oil spill cases, note 15 supra, were
extended under 43 C.F.R. §3319.9(a) (1979). This regulation is promulgated under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § § 1331-1343 (1976), and has the same
effect as 30 U.S.C. §209 (1976).

